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Chapter Five 
A Systems View of Time-dependent 
Ethical Decisions 
HAMID A. RAFIZADEH AND 
BRAD J. KALLENBERG 
SYSTEMS VIEW OF ETHICAL CHALLENGES 
Every ethical situation has a "system" characteristic with a group 
of human and nonhuman elements linked in a variety of interactions 
and interdependencies. The system allows the elements to act in part 
or as a whole towards achieving a spectrum of goals, objectives, or 
ends. 1 The systems view asserts that any local and bipolar understand-
ing of an ethical situation would be deficient as it would neglect cer-
tain interactions and interdependencies as well as overlook differing 
orientations of agents towards different goals and objectives. The pur-
pose of this paper is to highlight the need for a systems-based view of 
ethics. 
Systems thinking is not, of course, a panacea. It is one thing to 
have an intellect informed about the Good and quite another to have a 
volition reliably oriented to choose the Good. This latter issue is of 
central concern to Christian ethics but is not the focus of the present 
chapter. What is of concern to us is the usefulness of systems thinking 
104 
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for revealing the Good. This paper details five "systems thinking" prin-
ciples by analyzing a specific example of employee behavior under top 
management pressure. 
From a systems point of view, ethical considerations are tightly in-
tertwined with operational considerations and thus ought to attend to 
general features observed in system dynamics. For example, the obser-
vation that in operations people have a poor understanding of system 
dynamics would equally apply to ethical considerations. First, people 
see a system as an aggregation of components and not as interactions 
evolving over time. Second, people fail to recognize the significance of 
time delay between action and response because they tend to have a 
linear, here and now, view of causality 2 Our thesis is that systems 
thinking can help sensitize us to the dangers of overlooking the time 
delay between actions and their consequences. 
Each individual is located in a variety of multilayered systems. For 
example, as a worker, the average person stands in a web of relation-
ships with co-workers, subordinates, and superiors. The pattern of 
interactions between them constitutes the system called the corpora-
tion. The corporation is not merely the aggregate of all the people who 
Work there. It is the people plus the habits of their multilayered inter-
actions over time. The corporation itself is a part of the local business 
community. As such it stands in various political and economic rela-
tionships not only to its own employees but also to other corporations, 
the consumers, the state, and so on. 
But an individual also exists in a living community. As such, he or 
she is enmeshed in a web of relationships including nearby neighbors. 
The neighborhood interlocks with other neighborhoods, and together 
these comprise the political community. The pattern of relationships 
Within this neighborhood and between neighborhoods makes up the 
corporate persona of this municipality. Municipalities relate to each 
other within economic realities and legal and political strictures within 
the county, state, and nation. 
So then, each individual is simultaneously a worker, a neighbor, a 
family member, and so on. Each system is multilayered within itself 
and is intercalated with other systems. The layering is not predefined 
and can be variously dependent on where one draws a layer's boundary 
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and what one includes within it. Nonetheless, there are two features 
common to all systems. First, for all individuals the system is a nested 
structure. Second, some arbitrary boundary cutting across the layers is 
taken by a given individual as a "boundary of significance." The human 
attention and expenditure of resources primarily reside within the 
boundary of significance. For most individuals the boundary of sig-
nificance encompasses the home and workplace. A similar layering ex-
ists for the corporation. It defines the boundary of significance through 
setting objectives and allocating budgets. We argue that ethics requires 
intentional expansion of one's boundary of significance to view the 
surrounding things in increasingly holistic ways. 
For example, few people are conscious of the extent of their con-
nection with the biosphere.3 Let us start with the typical person's auto-
mobile, a popular component within the boundary of significance, 
transporting the individual between work and home. How much atten-
tion does the individual pay to the exhaust emitted from the automo-
bile? There is a good chance that an awareness of the exhaust manifests 
once every two years when the automobile must pass its emissions 
test. Otherwise, the individual rarely if ever "sees" the flow of the ex- · 
haust gases into the atmosphere and even more rarely wonders about 
its effect on the atmosphere. Now consider the gas furnace in the 
house. Does the individual ever pay attention to gases going up the 
chimney and into the atmosphere? Perhaps in some winters, receiving 
the gas company's bill, he or she may complain about the cost and the 
furnace gas consumption, but the furnace's gaseous emissions remain 
unnoticed. Another element within the individual's boundary of sig-
nificance is "electricity." To the individual it is a clean form of energy. 
His mind does not venture to the layer in which the power plant gen-
erating the electricity is located. Only there would the huge column of 
gaseous emissions rising into the atmosphere be noticeable. 
How do automobiles, gas furnaces, and electricity demonstrate the 
deficiencies of the typical moral vision? They do so by showing that the 
person focused on home and workplace does not see the consequences 
of gaseous emissions in layers beyond the home and workplace. More-
over, the typical ethical individual develops little understanding of 
the time delay between emissions from automobiles, gas furnaces, and 
- - ~ ---------~--- -~-----------
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electric power plants and the accumulation of the society's emission 
gases in the atmosphere. The emissions within the individual's layer of 
significance seem small and innocent. Yet, in today's conditions, at the 
final global layer the gaseous emissions accumulate at the rate of 22 bil-
lion tons per year.4 Assuming a human population of 6 billion, there is 
an accumulation of about four tons of gaseous waste per year per per-
son. Any accumulation at the rate of four tons per year would have 
quickly caught the eye of the individual if it happened within the 
boundary of significance or even in the next layer or two. But this is 
taking place at the last layer, that is, at a global level. Can we argue that 
since this is the system's last layer, it may not be significant for the in-
dividual even if it accumulates at the rate of four tons per year per per-
son? Such a conclusion is entirely unwarranted, because the buildup of 
gaseous emissions in the atmosphere can result in global warming. 
Here we arrive at the problem of "knowledge flow" across system lay-
ers. The knowledge relevant to the first layer may not reside there but 
in other layers. For example, while the words "global warming" may 
reach the individual, the implications of global warming do not. He or 
she would regularly dismiss as irrelevant the notion that earth's average 
temperature may increase by a degree or two. 5 The individual sees no-
ticeably higher temperature variability from morning to noon every 
day. The knowledge that fails to reach the individual is that the "aver-
age temperature" of earth controls the weather pattern and the weather 
pattern controls the output of agricultural products. A few degrees 
change in average global temperature can produce weather patterns 
that wreak havoc in the world's food supply. 6 With deficient food, the 
items lying within an individual's boundary of significance, namely the 
home and workplace, can face immense danger. Yet such a systems-
based linkage of the home, workplace, and the globe remains beyond 
the embrace of the individual's awareness. From the system dynamics 
point of view, this is not a surprise but a fact of human life-the in-
ability to see time-delayed effects of one's actions within the context of 
the whole system. Driving between home and workplace, the use of a 
gas furnace to heat the home, and the electricity to light the house and 
operate various gadgets, produce byproducts that accumulate globally 
to endanger the individual's boundary of significance decades later. 
.I 
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ETHICAL DYNAMICS-ANALYSIS OF 
A SIMPLE EXAMPLE 
The inability to see time-delayed relationship between action and 
response prevents the individual from comprehending the ethical di-
lemma of altering the atmosphere and its properties. Even if the ad-
verse effect on agriculture does not materialize, annual dumping of 
four tons of anything in the global backyard is significant enough to be 
noticed, but it rarely is. Though the issue of gaseous emissions high-
lights ethical human behavior with respect to long-term global issues, 
it is not an ordinary daily activity. To analyze more specific system dy-
namics of ethical considerations we will rely on a more mundane ex-
ample. 
In a business situation in 1984 in a regulated energy company, the 
engineer/manager in charge of the forecasting department prepared an 
energy consumption forecast to be presented to the regulatory agency 
to set the prices the company charged customers. The forecasting de-
partment developed a complex econometric model that projected a· 
4 percent growth in energy consumption. When the results were pre-
sented to the company CEO, he stood firm that the forecast was too 
high. With tens of adjustable parameters in the econometric model, 
the company's forecasting expert could reset some to create a lower 
rate of growth. The first parametric adjustments produced a forecasted 
growth rate of 2.5 percent. The CEO remained adamant that it was still 
too high. Another round of parameter adjustments produced a fore-
casted 1.5 percent growth. The CEO was pleased but added that he 
would like to see a forecast with 1 percent growth. With some grum-
bling the forecasting expert adjusted a few more parameters and the 
company forecast exhibited a 1 percent growth in energy consump-
tion. A thick report capturing the company's econometric model was 
prepared and submitted to the regulatory agency. 
The first ethical question concerns "parameter adjustments." Is it 
wiser to set the parameters at what the forecasting expert deems appro-
priate or at what the CEO declares proper? The positions taken by the 
CEO and the forecasting expert intersect at the historical data . The 
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choice of action differs by the choice of pointing to different layers of 
the system. The CEO could point to the pre-1981 growth numbers 
which were at 1 percent or less and declare the 3 to 4 percent trend of 
1981-1984 as an aberration, while the forecaster could point at the 
econometric model and claim that the higher trend was not an aberra-
tion but a result of underlying developments in the economy. Which 
position would be more correct? 
We claim that the CEO is acting legally but unwisely because he is 
choosing to ignore the best guess of the expert practitioner. This leads 
to an error that could have been avoided by expanding the range of 
one's system awareness. 
We offer a remedy in five steps. The first step of systems thinking 
is that the parameters must be set in a context broad enough to view all 
of the relevant parameters. Therefore, the choice of parameters ought 
to be expanded to include the full range of logically possible parame-
ters. In their conversation, not all parameters of the econometric model 
Were Well defined. For the sake of clarification of argument we will as-
sume that the choices for each parameter could be represented by a nor-
mal distribution as shown in figure 5.1. Arguments based on statistics 
0.45 
0.40 
0.35 
"' 0.30 
"' ~ 
... 0.25 ~ 
"' E 0.20 ~ 
~ 0.15 
0.10 
0.05 
o.oo 
.• 
-3.0 
-2.0 -1.0 0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 
Parameter Value 
Figures 
.1 Which Choice is More Ethical? 
110 Hamid A. Rafizadeh & Brad]. Kallenberg 
would claim the parameter value should be set at the most probable. 
But statistical arguments do not overrule subjective considerations. For 
example, in flipping a coin the forecaster would go with 50 percent 
chance of heads or tails, while an expert gambler could go with the 100 
percent feel of three consecutive heads. The statistical considerations 
cannot rule against the gambler's sense of events. They remain at a 
stalemate. Which position is more correct, the one purely based on 
most probable considerations or a mix of statistics and subjective con-
siderations? Can the same argument be made for positions taken by the 
forecaster and the CEO? 
The second step is to understand the system as an embodiment of 
a "portfolio of objectives." Since all systems are layered and interca-
lated with other systems, one must specify some range or other for an-
alyzing the system(s). (To define the economic system as what's in 
my wallet is too narrow. To examine my household budget in light of 
its impact on India's soft-drink industry may be too broad.) Within a 
given range, each system has an ordered set of priorities or objectives. 
This set is called its "portfolio of objectives. " 
The larger a system gets and the more layers are considered, the · 
more distributed the portfolio of objectives becomes. For the fore-
caster, the key issue within a narrowly restricted range is the reliability 
and accuracy of the forecast. But we can surmise that in the CEO's out-
look parameters such as profitability are the primary objective of the 
portfolio. In effect the two were engaged in a conversation in which 
each took a position relative to a system quite different from the other. 
There was no attempt at identifying the definition of the system, its 
layers, and the boundary of significance. Their miscommunication was 
further complicated by the fact that the portfolio of objectives is not 
only relative to a given range, it is also hierarchical. Even if the CEO 
and forecaster had presumed the same objectives, it is clear that for the 
CEO profitability sits higher than accuracy and reliability of a fore-
casted aspect of corporate operations. What role does systems thinking 
play in determining the ranking of a portfolio of objectives? 
From the CEO's point of view, profitability is inversely linked to 
the forecasted growth potential. Consider the regulated company's 
total expenses, including a reasonable profit, as Total Cost. This has to 
be divided by the average consumption over the period under consid-
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eration to set the price charged to the customers. The average con-
sumption, however, varies by the growth rate. The price the company 
can charge customers is thus determined by the relationship: 
Price = 
Total Cost 
Average [CoTICl +a)"] 
n 
where a is the growth rate, n the number of years under consideration 
for rate setting, usually three to four years, and Co a constant factor de-
termined by historical consumption. The pi operator is a product op-
erator. This equation simply states that price can be forecasted from 
the growth rate, and that the forecasted price is the product of growth 
in year 1, 2, 3, and so on. 
From the CEO's point of view, a low forecasted growth rate would 
set the price high, improve profitability and reduce risk, while a high 
forecasted growth rate would do the opposite. While in appearance the 
CEO-forecaster dialogue is centered on reliability of the forecast, it in 
fact engages two totally different objectives simultaneously. The fore-
caster remains unaware of the CEO's profitability objective and can 
only assume the CEO's concerns emanate from the pre-1981 historical 
growth rate of about 1 percent. Is a dialogue that does not reveal the 
entire "portfolio of objectives" ethical? Or, more generically, at what 
level of knowledge deficiency do the ethical considerations become ir-
relevant, overwhelmed by poor knowledge? 
As we have seen, systems thinking reveals that the CEO-forecaster 
conversation artificially restricts the portfolio of objectives under con-
sideration. But their conversation is skewed because the forecaster mis-
takenly imagines the CEO as the only significant other in the conver-
sation. The third step in systems approach, therefore, involves the 
forecaster expanding his or her vision to include the silent partners. 
What appears to the forecaster to be a local and binary interaction ac-
tually involves another key player, the regulatory agency. The forecast 
that the company prepares and sends to the regulatory agency is re-
viewed and scrutinized by the regulatory agency's forecasting experts. 
In setting the price, the regulatory agency can declare the company's 
forecasted growth rate low and adjust it to a higher number deemed 
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more appropriate by the agency's forecasters. It is the regulatory agen-
cy's function to protect the customers from corporate overcharging and 
high prices. The regulatory structure exists primarily on the assump-
tion that the energy company will try its best to maximize profitability 
and charge the customers the highest price possible. Given such an ar-
rangement, how does it modify our view of ethical behavior of the CEO 
and the company forecaster? Are the regulatory agency's forecasting ex-
perts and commissioners as ethically responsible, or perhaps even more 
responsible, than the energy company actors? Unlike the corporation, 
in principle, the agency should not have any internal profitability man-
date, and its primary objective should be to set fair prices. 
The ethically interesting aspect of this three-element view of the 
system is that often the regulatory agency chooses to accept unques-
tioningly7 the company's forecast as valid. Is it possible that the regula-
tory agency and its own analysts do not comprehend the company's 
econometric model or do not understand the impact of growth rate on 
prices charged to customers? The truth is simpler than that. The regu-
latory agency allows overcollection by the company because it canal-
locate part of the overcollection to its own favorite social engineering . 
experiments in the form of "energy efficiency projects" which it has no 
other way of funding! (In short, kickbacks make the world go 'round.) 
If the company is held, for example, to a consumption growth of 4 per-
cent, the regulatory agency will have no leverage on the company to 
force it to take on the agency's "social engineering experiments." How-
ever, if the regulatory agency allows the company to collect more from 
customers under the assumption of a l percent consumption growth, 
then it can negotiate for a share of the over-collection towards the 
agency's energy efficiency programs. 
Is any of this unethical? Not in the sense of being illegal. However, 
insofar as no party has troubled to look at the wider system, it is the 
economic equivalent of dumping pollution into the air by means of an 
inefficient furnace. After all, the regulatory agency does not take from 
customers for personal or organizational gain but for experiments that 
if successful may provide value to all customers. Similarly, from the 
CEO's point of view the negotiations with the agency are simply to set 
the level of profitability of the company. The more profitable the com-
pany, the more it will be able to serve the needs of the customers more 
efficiently at a higher level of financial stability. 
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From the systems point of view the ethical situation that started 
With the "choice of forecast parameters" ended up with "extra re-
sources taken from the customers" and allocated to corporate profit-
ability and social engineering. The different choices of the system's 
boundary of significance make it collectively defective. 
For our present purposes, the difficulty in "seeing the whole pic-
ture" is a function of three things. First., the engineer/manager, the 
forecasting expert, and the CEO lack a systems thinking education. 
During their education, none learns the basics of defining and seeing 
the interactions and interdependencies of the workplace in systems 
terms. Second, no training program at the workplace corrects the lack 
of "systems thinking training. " In fact the workplace's fragmentation 
and segmentation ensures that no one at the lower ranks would de-
velop a systems view of the corporate operations. The executives at the 
top develop a biased view of the system tilted towards corporate profit-
ability within a layer of significance defined by the corporation. 
Third, even if the universities taught systems thinking to students 
and even if corporations adopted a code of conduct to train employees 
in systems thinking, system dynamics tells us the few that control cor-
porate resources , namely the executives, define the system. The CEO 
Would have no problem bypassing a systems-conscious forecaster by 
simply assigning the preparation of the forecast to a consultant who 
Would gladly produce a l percent growth forecast in return for its con-
sulting fee. Because of this power structure, the ethical character of 
the entire system would largely depend on the behavior of its resource 
controller, namely the corporate executives. Nevertheless, it is our 
hope that systems thinking education and training have the potential 
to substantially reduce the possibilities for unethical behavior by the 
executives. 
SEEKING THE SOLUTION IN THE WISDOM 
OF CHRISTIANITY 
It is wrongheaded to imagine blithely that, moving on separate 
paths, systems thinking and Christian ethics will inevitably converge 
on common morality. A systems thinking approach that is disconnected 
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from Christianity will inevitably narrate the world as an economic story 
of individuals and their aggregates (corporations) who compete against 
each other in a zero-sum game of survival of the fittest. Such opposition 
between players clearly does not tell the Christian story of creation and 
redemption. The resulting portfolios of objectives would be desperately 
disordered. The proper order will not emerge by simply staring at the 
data. Rather, what is needed as a fourth step is a theological vision of 
the system. 
In other words, what is missing in the present picture is a Good 
common to all (because it comes as a gift), one that provides orienta-
tion for all the proximate goods and in light of which all other goods 
must be ranked. Pope john Paul II wrote in Laborem exercens that com-
petition for profit is not the root of all evil-an unfair charge com-
monly leveled against Christian thought. Rather, keeping evil from 
taking root requires setting up the system in such a way that it (1) 
maximizes profit without destroying others, (2) maximizes creativity 
and internal goods for workers and practitioners, and (3) maximizes 
the Common Good for all, including those who are outside the walls of . 
the corporation (not only the consumer, but also, for example, those 
who live down river from the plant) 8 This vision of the Common 
Good views the system at its widest scope. It asks us to see the busi-
ness world as contributing to the Common Good rather than as epito-
mizing survival of the fittest. 
The fifth step in taking a systems approach is to ask the question 
of time delay. Not only are systems "spatially" layered and intercalated, 
they and their component parts (in our case, human beings) are ex-
tended through time. It took the forecaster, Hamid Rafizadeh, about 
twenty years to comprehend the system dynamics of parameter adjust-
ments he made in the econometric model. The revelation took place 
after a few years of studying and teaching systems thinking. Even then, 
it was accidentally triggered in the aftermath of a classroom setting in 
2005 where the professor asked, "Have any of you been pressured by 
your boss to do something not morally right?" To the forecaster, now a 
student in the class, the 1984 actions in the 1984 time frame looked 
professionally and ethically above board. But looking at the events of 
1984 with the knowledge base of 2005, which included a deeper un-
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derstanding of the corporate and regulatory agency relationship, he 
was no longer sure. Could he have been able to stand up to the CEO's 
demands if he were as aware of the corporate system then as he is 
now?9 But surely this is a moot point. For, the forecaster at that time 
simply could not see it. 
Did his ignorance then make him innocent of any ethical wrong-
doing? Maybe yes, maybe no. St. Thomas Aquinas explains that igno-
rance relates to culpability in a variety of ways. Blameless ignorance he 
calls "antecedent ignorance"-the kind of ignorance that is genuine 
and simply precedes the agent's action. But there are three other kinds 
of ignorance. Concomitant ignorance describes the case in which had 
the agent known better, the agent would still have chosen the present 
course of action. If knowing better makes no difference to the course 
of action, then the person acting is just as blameworthy either way. The 
other kinds of ignorance fall under the category of "consequent igno-
rance," so called because it is a state of ignorance adopted after or for 
the sake of the action taken. For example, affected ignorance describes 
the case in which the agent chose to avoid knowing for the sake of 
having an excuse! The other form of consequent ignorance is called ig-
norance of evil choice. It describes the case in which the agent was gen-
uinely ignorant, but is so because of a flaw in his or her character. For 
example, perhaps the agent did not take the time to read the warning 
or Was too lazy to study the appropriate data. In all these latter cases, 
ignorance does not spare the agent from being morally blameworthy. 10 
We see, then, that Aquinas does not give a simple answer. Yet in 
our story, the forecaster's ignorance seems genuinely of the "anteced-
ent" variety. That is to say, the forecaster's ignorance is blameless in 
that it is not a product of some character defect in the forecaster. That 
being so, the forecaster is most likely not culpable for the economic 
sins committed by the power company against the consumers on the 
basis of the forecaster's report. Granted, the forecaster igns ofT on a 
growth rate that seems low, but still allowable within the parameters of 
the model employed. What the forecaster does not know as a young 
professional in 1984 is the hidden scheme of the CEO. But two de-
cades later, it dawns on the forecaster that the CEO had ulterior mo-
tives for setting the growth rate lower than predicted. 
"' ,, 
I 
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The clever reader will have discerned that the "time dependence" 
given by the two examples is clearly not equivalent. In the case of the 
automobile and furnace emissions, global warming is the natural ac-
cumulation of greenhouse gases over time. Because the time of the 
accumulation is very long-much longer than twenty years-the sig-
nificance of the single consumer is trivial. The impact of a single con-
sumer goes unnoticed. In the second case, "time dependence" refers to 
the maturation of the forecaster over a twenty year period. The fore-
caster's gaining of awareness is not simply the accumulation of infor-
mation; otherwise the time delay could be countered by intensive up-
loading of information on the front end of the forecaster's career. But 
growth of insight can never be simplified to mere acquisition of infor-
mation. Rather, his coming to know was time consuming because in 
addition to information, the forecaster needed time to develop the 
skill of sorting what he was seeing. As Aristotle noted, cultivating the 
habits of moral vision necessarily takes time. While twenty years is 
the blink of the planet's eye, twenty years is a very long time in the life 
of an individual. 
Educators and mentors of engineers are players in a system that in-
cludes, for example, forecasters for power companies. The leverage 
they exert on students and underlings falls short of being able to orient 
volition-only God can do that! But they do have a role to play in shap-
ing the outlook of those they teach and guide. It has been said that if a 
burglar is breaking into the house, it is too late to start lifting weights! 
Fortunately, students are not yet facing burglars, corrupt CEOs, or 
crooked regulatory agencies. In the meantime, educators must urge 
students to begin lifting moral barbells. In our view, the five steps of 
systems thinking is a helpful conditioning program that promises to 
shorten the time delay between now and the day when students be-
come engineers who see and act holistically when faced with ethical 
decisions. 
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